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DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, 
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DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; UNITED STATES 
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MOST REVEREND LAWRENCE T. PERSICO, BISHOP 
OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF ERIE, AS 
TRUSTEE OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF 
ERIE, A CHARITABLE TRUST; THE ROMAN 
CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF ERIE; ST. MARTIN CENTER, 
INC., AN AFFILIATE NONPROFIT CORPORATION OF 
CATHOLIC CHARITIES OF THE DIOCESE OF ERIE; 
PRINCE OF PEACE CENTER, INC., AN AFFILIATE 
NONPROFIT CORPORATION OF CATHOLIC 
CHARITIES OF THE DIOCESE OF ERIE; ERIE 
CATHOLIC PREPARATORY SCHOOL, AN AFFILIATE 
NONPROFIT CORPORATION OF THE ROMAN 
CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF ERIE 
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SECRETARY OF UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES; SECRETARY OF 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; 
SECRETARY OF UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 
THE TREASURY; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES; UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, 
 
Appellants in case no. 14-1376 
 
 
MOST REVEREND DAVID A. ZUBIK, BISHOP OF THE 
ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF PITTSBURGH, as 
Trustee of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Pittsburgh, a 
Charitable Trust; THE ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF 
PITTSBURGH, as the Beneficial Owner of the Pittsburgh 
series of The Catholic Benefits Trust; CATHOLIC 
CHARITIES OF THE DIOCESE OF PITTSBURGH, INC., 
an affiliate nonprofit corporation of The Roman Catholic 
Diocese of Pittsburgh 
 
v. 
 
SECRETARY OF UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES; SECRETARY OF 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; 
SECRETARY OF UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 
THE TREASURY; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES; UNITED STATES 
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and Urging Affirmance  
 
   
O P I N I O N 
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 
 The appellees in these consolidated appeals challenge 
the preventive services requirements of the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119 (2010), under the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4.  
Particularly, the appellees object to the ACA’s requirement 
that contraceptive coverage be provided to their plan 
participants and beneficiaries.  However, the nonprofit 
appellees are eligible for an accommodation to the 
contraceptive coverage requirement, whereby once they 
advise that they will not pay for the contraceptive services, 
coverage for those services will be independently provided by 
an insurance issuer or third-party administrator.  The 
appellees urge that the accommodation violates RFRA 
because it forces them to “facilitate” or “trigger” the 
provision of insurance coverage for contraceptive services, 
which they oppose on religious grounds.  The appellees 
affiliated with the Catholic Church also object on the basis 
that the application of the accommodation to Catholic 
nonprofit organizations has the impermissible effect of 
dividing the Catholic Church, because the Dioceses 
themselves are eligible for an actual exemption from the 
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contraceptive coverage requirement.  The District Courts 
granted the appellees’ motions for a preliminary injunction, 
and, in one of the cases, converted the preliminary injunction 
to a permanent injunction.  Because we disagree with the 
District Courts and conclude that the accommodation places 
no substantial burden on the appellees, we will reverse.  
 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Statutory and Regulatory Background 
1. The Affordable Care Act, the Preventive 
Services Coverage Requirement, and the 
Accommodation for Religious Nonprofit 
Organizations 
 
 In 2010, Congress passed the ACA, which requires 
group health plans and health insurance issuers offering 
health insurance coverage1 to cover preventive care and 
screenings for women, without cost sharing (such as a 
copayment, coinsurance, or a deductible), as provided for in 
guidelines established by the Department of Health and 
                                              
1 Eligible organizations may be either “insured” or “self-
insured.”  An employer has an “insured” plan if it contracts 
with an insurance company to bear the financial risk of 
paying its employees’ health insurance claims.  An employer 
has a “self-insured” plan if it bears the financial risk of paying 
its employees’ claims.  Many self-insured employers use 
third-party administrators to administer their plans and 
process claims.  See Cong. Budget Office, Key Issues in 
Analyzing Major Health Insurance Proposals 6 (2008).  The 
appellees here fall into both categories. 
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Human Services (“HHS”).  42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4).2  
HHS requested assistance from the Institute of Medicine 
(“IOM”), a nonprofit arm of the National Academy of 
Sciences, to develop guidelines regarding which preventive 
services for women should be required.  Group Health Plans 
and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of 
Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8726 (Feb. 15, 
2012) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; and 
45 C.F.R. pt. 147).  The IOM issued a report recommending a 
list of preventive care services, including all contraceptive 
methods approved by the Food and Drug Administration 
(“FDA”).  The regulatory guidelines accordingly included 
“[a]ll Food and Drug Administration . . . approved 
contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient 
education and counseling for all women with reproductive 
capacity,” as prescribed by a health care provider.  77 Fed. 
Reg. at 8725 (alteration in original).  The relevant regulations 
require coverage of the contraceptive services recommended 
in the guidelines.  See 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2713(a)(1)(iv); 29 
C.F.R. § 2590.715-2713(a)(1)(iv); 45 C.F.R. 
§ 147.130(a)(1)(iv). 
 
                                              
2 The ACA’s preventive care requirements apply only to non-
grandfathered group health plans and health insurance issuers 
offering non-grandfathered health insurance coverage.  See 45 
C.F.R. § 147.140 (exempting “grandfathered” plans—
“coverage provided by a group health plan, or a group or 
individual health insurance issuer, in which an individual was 
enrolled as of March 23, 2010,” the date on which the ACA 
was enacted “for as long as it maintains that status under the 
rules of this section”). 
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 The implementing regulations authorize an exemption 
from contraceptive coverage for the group health plan of a 
“religious employer.”  45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a).  The 
regulations define a religious employer as a nonprofit 
organization described in the Internal Revenue Code 
provision referring to churches, their integrated auxiliaries, 
and conventions or associations of churches, and the 
exclusively religious activities of any religious order.  Id. 
(citing 26 U.S.C. § 6033(a)(3)(A)(i), (iii)). 
 
 After notice-and-comment rulemaking, the Department 
of the Treasury, the Department of Labor, and the Department 
of Health and Human Services (the “Departments”) published 
final regulations in July 2013 that provided relief for 
organizations that, while not “religious employers,” 
nonetheless oppose coverage on account of their religious 
objections.  These regulations include an “accommodation” 
for group health plans established or maintained by “eligible 
organizations” (and group health coverage provided in 
connection with such plans).  See 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-
2713A(a), 29 C.F.R. § 2590-2713A(a), 45 C.F.R. 
§ 147.131(b); Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under 
the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,870 (July 2, 2013) 
(codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pts. 2510 & 2590; and 
45 C.F.R. pts. 147 & 156).  An “eligible organization” means 
a nonprofit organization that “holds itself out as a religious 
organization” and “opposes providing coverage for some or 
all of any contraceptive services required to be covered . . . on 
account of religious objections.”  45 C.F.R. § 147.131(b).  To 
invoke this accommodation, an employer must certify that it 
is such an organization.  Id. § 147.131(b)(4).  Here, there is 
no dispute that the nonprofit religious organization appellees 
are eligible organizations under these regulations.   
15 
 
 
 To take advantage of the accommodation to the 
contraceptive coverage requirement, the eligible organization 
must complete the self-certification form, EBSA Form 700, 
issued by the Department of Labor’s Employee Benefits 
Security Administration, indicating that it has a religious 
objection to providing coverage for the required contraceptive 
services.  The eligible organization then is to provide a copy 
of the form to its insurance issuer or third-party administrator.  
78 Fed. Reg. at 39,875.3 
                                              
3 After these suits had been filed, the Supreme Court granted 
an injunction pending appeal in Wheaton College v. Burwell, 
134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014), and ordered that the eligible 
organization applicant need not use EBSA Form 700 to notify 
its insurance issuer or third-party administrator of its religious 
objection to the contraceptive coverage requirement; instead, 
if the organization notifies the government in writing of its 
objection, the government is enjoined from enforcing the 
contraceptive coverage requirement against the organization.  
Id. at 2807.  In response, interim final regulations were issued 
in August 2014 allowing an eligible organization to opt out 
by notifying HHS directly, rather than notifying its insurance 
issuer or third-party administrator; the eligible organization 
also need not use EBSA Form 700.  Coverage of Certain 
Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 79 Fed. 
Reg. 51,092 (Aug. 27, 2014) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 
C.F.R. pts. 2510 & 2590; and 45 C.F.R. pt. 147); see also 29 
C.F.R. § 2590.715-2713A(b)(1)(ii)(B), (c)(1)(ii); 45 C.F.R. 
§ 147.131(c)(1)(ii).  We conclude here that the 
accommodation, even when utilizing EBSA Form 700, poses 
no substantial burden.  To the extent that the Supreme Court’s 
order in Wheaton may be read to signal that the alternative 
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 The submission of the form has no real effect on the 
plan participants and beneficiaries.  They still have access to 
contraception, without cost sharing, through alternate 
mechanisms in the regulations.4  Under these regulations, an 
eligible organization is not required “to contract, arrange, pay, 
or refer for contraceptive coverage” to which it objects on 
religious grounds.  78 Fed. Reg. at 39,874.  As a result, either 
the health insurance issuer or the third-party administrator is 
required by regulation to provide separate payments for 
contraceptive services for plan participants and beneficiaries.  
The ACA’s prohibition on cost sharing for preventive 
services, including contraception, bars the insurance issuer or 
third-party administrator from imposing any premium or fee 
on the group health plan, or plan participants and 
beneficiaries.  Furthermore, the accommodation prohibits the 
insurance issuer or third-party administrator from imposing 
such fees on the eligible organization.  See 42 U.S.C. 
                                                                                                     
notification procedure is less burdensome than using EBSA 
Form 700, we also conclude that the alternative compliance 
mechanism set forth in the August 2014 regulations poses no 
substantial burden. 
4 The Supreme Court has recognized that the accommodation 
ensures that employees of entities with religious objections 
have the same access to all FDA-approved contraceptives as 
employees of entities without religious objections to 
providing such coverage.  “The effect of the HHS-created 
accommodation on the women employed . . . would be 
precisely zero.  Under that accommodation, these women 
would still be entitled to all FDA-approved contraceptives 
without cost sharing.”  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 
134 S. Ct. 2751, 2760 (2014).   
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§ 300gg-13(a); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2713A(b)(2), (c)(2)(ii); 
45 C.F.R. § 147.131(c)(2)(ii).  The insurance issuer or third-
party administrator must “[e]xpressly exclude contraceptive 
coverage from the group health insurance coverage provided 
in connection with the [eligible organization’s] group health 
plan” and “segregate premium revenue collected from the 
eligible organization from the monies used to provide 
payments for contraceptive services.”  29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-
2713A(c)(2)(i)(A), (ii); 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(c)(2)(i)(A), (ii).  
The third-party administrator may seek reimbursement for 
payments for contraceptive services from the federal 
government.  29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2713A(b)(3).   
 
 Furthermore, the health insurance issuer or third-party 
administrator, not the eligible organization, provides notice to 
the plan participants and beneficiaries regarding contraceptive 
coverage “separate from” materials that are distributed in 
connection with the eligible organization’s group health 
coverage, specifying that “the eligible organization does not 
administer or fund contraceptive benefits, but that the third 
party administrator or issuer, as applicable, provides separate 
payments for contraceptive services, and must provide 
contact information for questions and complaints.”  See 26 
C.F.R. § 54.9815-2713A(d); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2713A(d); 
45 C.F.R. § 147.131(d).5  This is in accordance with the 
preventive services requirement of the ACA. 
                                              
5 As part of this separate notice regime, eligible organizations 
do not need to provide the names of their beneficiaries to their 
insurance issuers or third-party administrators, or otherwise 
coordinate notices with them.  See Priests for Life v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 254 (D.C. 
Cir. 2014) (agreeing that “[n]o regulation related to the 
18 
 
 
2. RFRA Challenge to the Accommodation 
 The appellees challenge the ACA’s contraceptive 
coverage requirement as posing a substantial burden on their 
religious exercise, in violation of RFRA.  RFRA places 
requirements on all federal statutes that impact a person’s 
exercise of religion, even when that federal statute is a rule of 
general applicability.  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a).6  Under 
RFRA, the “[g]overnment may substantially burden a 
person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that 
application of the burden to the person—(1) is in furtherance 
of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least 
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental 
interest.”  Id. § 2000bb-1(b).   
                                                                                                     
accommodation imposes any such duty on Plaintiffs”); see 
also 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2713A(b)(4) (“A third party 
administrator may not require any documentation other than a 
copy of the self-certification from the eligible organization or 
notification from the Department of Labor”); id. § 2590.715-
2713A(c)(1)(i) (“When a copy of the self-certification is 
provided directly to an issuer, the issuer has sole 
responsibility for providing such coverage . . . . An issuer 
may not require any further documentation from the eligible 
organization regarding its status as such.”). 
 
6 Because the issue was not raised before us, we assume that 
RFRA is constitutional as applied to federal laws and 
regulations.  But see City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 
536 (1997) (holding that Congress did not have authority 
under the Fourteenth Amendment to impose RFRA on state 
or local laws). 
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 Congress enacted RFRA in 1993 in response to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division, 
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 
U.S. 872 (1990).  In Smith, the Supreme Court rejected the 
balancing test for evaluating claims under the Free Exercise 
Clause of the First Amendment set forth in Sherbert v. 
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 
U.S. 205 (1972), under which the Court asked whether the 
challenged law substantially burdened a religious practice 
and, if it did, whether that burden was justified by a 
compelling governmental interest.  The Smith Court 
concluded that the continued application of the compelling-
interest test would produce a constitutional right to ignore 
neutral laws of general applicability and would “open the 
prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions 
from civil obligations of almost every conceivable kind,” 
which the First Amendment does not require.  494 U.S. at 
888-89.  “The government’s ability to enforce generally 
applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct, like its 
ability to carry out other aspects of public policy, ‘cannot 
depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on 
a religious objector’s spiritual development.’”  Id. at 885 
(quoting Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 
U.S. 439, 451 (1988)).  Making an individual’s obligation to 
obey a generally applicable law contingent upon the 
individual’s religious beliefs, except where the state interest is 
compelling, permits that individual, “by virtue of his beliefs, 
‘to become a law unto himself,’” which “contradicts both 
constitutional tradition and common sense.”  Id. (quoting 
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878)). 
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 Congress then passed RFRA to legislatively overrule 
the Smith standard for analyzing claims under the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.  RFRA’s stated 
purposes are:  (1) to restore the compelling-interest test as set 
forth in Sherbert and Yoder and to guarantee its application in 
all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially 
burdened; and (2) to provide a claim or defense to persons 
whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by the 
government.  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b).  The Supreme Court has 
characterized RFRA as “adopt[ing] a statutory rule 
comparable to the constitutional rule rejected in Smith.”  
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 
546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006). 
 
B. Factual Background and Procedural History7 
 
 We review here the following District Court opinions:  
two preliminary injunctions issued in Geneva College v. 
Sebelius, and a preliminary injunction and permanent 
injunction issued in the related cases of Most Reverend David 
A. Zubik v. Sebelius and Most Reverend Lawrence T. Persico 
v. Sebelius.  The Zubik and Persico appeals were consolidated 
and now have also been consolidated with the Geneva appeal. 
 
1. Geneva Appellee 
 
 Appellee Geneva College (“Geneva”) is a nonprofit 
institution of higher learning established by the Reformed 
Presbyterian Church of North America.  Geneva believes that 
                                              
7 The District Courts in these cases had jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and this Court has appellate jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292(a)(1). 
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it would be sinful and immoral for it to intentionally 
participate in, pay for, facilitate, enable, or otherwise support 
access to abortion (including emergency contraceptives Plan 
B and ella, and two intrauterine devices, all of which Geneva 
characterizes as causing abortion) because such participation 
violates religious prohibitions on murder.  Geneva contracts 
with an insurance issuer for its student and employee health 
insurance plans.   
 
2. Geneva District Court Opinions 
 
 The District Court granted Geneva’s motion for a 
preliminary injunction with respect to its student plan on June 
18, 2013, and enjoined the government from applying or 
enforcing 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) and requiring that 
Geneva’s student health insurance plan, its plan broker, or its 
plan insurer provide “abortifacients” contrary to Geneva’s 
religious objections.  (J.A. 35-36.)  The District Court began 
by stating that the Supreme Court has cautioned courts to be 
reluctant to “dissect religious beliefs” when engaging in a 
substantial burden analysis.  (J.A. 24 (quoting Thomas v. 
Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715 
(1981)).) 
 The District Court concluded that Geneva had shown a 
likelihood of success on the merits with respect to the 
presence of a substantial burden under RFRA and found that 
three Supreme Court free exercise cases supported Geneva’s 
argument regarding the presence of a substantial burden 
under RFRA.  First, it noted that in Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234-
35, a state compulsory education law for children up to age 
sixteen, with a penalty of a criminal fine, violated the free 
exercise rights of the Amish plaintiffs.  Second, in Sherbert, 
374 U.S. at 410, the state could not withhold unemployment 
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benefits from a worker who refused employment on the 
grounds that working Saturdays violated her religious beliefs.  
Third, in Thomas, 450 U.S. at 719, the state could not deny 
unemployment benefits to a worker whose religious beliefs 
forbade his participation in manufacturing tanks for use by 
the military.  The District Court interpreted these cases as 
standing for the proposition that these indirect burdens on 
religious exercise are substantial enough to be cognizable 
under RFRA.  The District Court concluded that Geneva had 
only two choices under the regulations—either provide the 
objected-to coverage or drop its health insurance—and by 
being forced to choose between those two options, both 
repugnant to its religious beliefs,8 Geneva faced a substantial 
burden.   
 The District Court then granted Geneva’s second 
motion for a preliminary injunction, this time with respect to 
                                              
8 We recognize that the appellees believe providing health 
insurance to their employees and students is part of their 
religious commitments.  The appellees urge, at most, that 
dropping their health insurance coverage would be a violation 
of their moral beliefs, but they do not argue that it would be, 
in and of itself, another substantial burden imposed on their 
religious exercise.  (Geneva Br. at 5 (“To fulfill its religious 
commitments and duties in the Christ-centered educational 
context, the College promotes the spiritual and physical well-
being and health of its employees and students.  This includes 
the provision of general health insurance to employees and 
their dependants and the facilitation of a student health 
plan.”); Zubik/Persico Br. at 6 (“As part of overseeing their 
affiliates and as part of Catholic social teaching, the Dioceses 
provide self-insured health plans for Diocesan entities, 
including the Affiliates.”).)   
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its employee plan, on December 23, 2013.  The District Court 
again enjoined the government from enforcing 42 U.S.C. § 
300gg-13(a)(4) and requiring that Geneva’s employee health 
insurance plan, its plan broker, or its plan insurer provide 
“abortifacients” contrary to Geneva’s religious objections.  
(J.A. 67-68.)  The District Court concluded that Geneva had 
shown a likelihood of success on the merits as to the presence 
of a substantial burden because the self-certification process 
forced Geneva to facilitate access to services it finds 
religiously objectionable.  First, the District Court 
emphasized that a court must assess the intensity of the 
coercion and pressure from the government, rather than 
looking at the merits of the religious belief.  (J.A. 58 (citing 
Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 683 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. 
denied sub nom. Burwell v. Korte, 134 S. Ct. 2903 (2014), 
and Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 
1137 (10th Cir.), aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014)).)  The District Court 
analogized to cases involving the contraceptive coverage 
mandate for entities not eligible for the accommodation, such 
as the Hobby Lobby opinion in the Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit, which found that the substantial fines and 
penalties imposed on an entity that refused to offer health 
care coverage to its employees at all, or refused to provide 
coverage for the mandated preventive services, constituted a 
substantial burden.   
 
 The District Court was convinced by Geneva’s 
explanation that, although Geneva must engage in the same 
conduct that it did before the ACA—namely, notify the 
insurance carrier that it would not provide coverage for the 
objected-to services—the effect of that conduct is now 
different.  Before the ACA, Geneva’s notification resulted in 
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its employees being unable to obtain coverage for 
contraceptive services; after the ACA, Geneva’s employees 
are still provided access to the services as a matter of law.  
“Under the ACA, Geneva has two choices:  (1) provide 
insurance coverage to its employees, which will result in 
coverage for the objected to services; or (2) refuse to provide 
insurance coverage for its employees, which will result in 
fines, harm to its employees’ well-being and competitive 
disadvantages.  Both options require Geneva to act contrary 
to its religious duties and beliefs.”  (J.A. 61 n.12.)  
 
 Geneva argues that the District Court was correct that 
a substantial burden is present here because (1) complying 
with either the contraceptive coverage requirement or the 
accommodation would cause Geneva to “trigger,” “facilitate,” 
or be “complicit” in the commission of acts that it likens to 
abortion; and (2) the fines that Geneva faces for its refusal to 
comply with the contraceptive coverage requirement or the 
accommodation would pressure it to conform.   
3. Zubik/Persico Appellees 
Appellees in the Zubik and Persico cases include:  the 
Bishop of Pittsburgh, David A. Zubik, and the Bishop of Erie, 
Lawrence T. Persico; the Diocese of Pittsburgh and the 
Diocese of Erie, both of which qualify for the exemption to 
the contraceptive coverage requirement under 45 C.F.R. § 
147.131(a); and Catholic Charities of the Diocese of 
Pittsburgh, Prince of Peace Center, St. Martin Center, and 
Erie Catholic Cathedral Preparatory School, which are all 
nonprofit organizations affiliated with the Catholic Church.  
The Catholic religious nonprofit organizations are controlled 
by their respective Dioceses and operate in accordance with 
Catholic doctrine and teachings.  The Bishops oversee the 
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management of the affiliated nonprofits with regard to 
adherence to Catholic doctrine.  The Catholic faith prohibits 
providing, subsidizing, initiating, or facilitating insurance 
coverage for sterilization services, contraceptives, other drugs 
that the Catholic Church believes to cause abortion, and 
related reproductive educational and counseling services.  
The Dioceses provide self-insured health plans to the 
nonprofits and contract with third-party administrators to 
handle claims administration of the plans.  As a result of their 
provision of coverage to the nonprofits, the Dioceses, which 
are otherwise exempt, must comply with the contraceptive 
coverage requirement as to the nonprofits. 
 
4. Zubik/Persico District Court Opinions 
 
 The District Court issued a preliminary injunction that 
applied to both the Zubik and Persico cases on November 21, 
2013, and converted that injunction into a permanent 
injunction on December 20, 2013.   
 The District Court characterized the issue before it as 
“whether [the appellees], being non-secular in nature, are 
likely to succeed on the merits of proving that their right to 
freely exercise their religion has been substantially burdened 
by the ‘accommodation’ which requires the Bishops of two 
separate Dioceses . . . to sign a form which thereby 
facilitates/initiates the provision of contraceptive products, 
services, and counseling.”  (J.A. 116.)  The Zubik/Persico 
appellees conceded that they have provided similar 
information as is required by the self-certification form to 
their third-party administrator in the past.  However, their past 
actions barred the provision of contraceptive products, 
services, or counseling.  Now, under the ACA, this 
information will be used to “facilitate/initiate the provision of 
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contraceptive products, services, or counseling – in direct 
contravention to their religious tenets.”  (Id.)  Accordingly, 
the District Court concluded that the government is 
impermissibly asking the appellees for documentation for 
what the appellees sincerely believe is an immoral purpose, 
and thus “they cannot provide it.”  (J.A. 117.)  In conclusion, 
the District Court acknowledged that the accommodation 
allows the appellees to avoid directly paying for contraceptive 
services by shifting responsibility for providing contraceptive 
coverage.  Despite this fact, because the appellees had a 
sincerely held belief that this shift in responsibility did not 
exonerate them from the moral implications of the use of 
contraception, the accommodation imposed a substantial 
burden.   
 
 Furthermore, the District Court held that the differing 
application of the exemption and the accommodation—the 
former applying to the Catholic Church, and the latter 
applying to Catholic nonprofit organizations—has the effect 
of dividing the Catholic Church, thereby imposing a 
substantial burden.  “[T]he religious employer 
‘accommodation’ separates the ‘good works (faith in action) 
employers’ from the ‘houses of worship employers’ within 
the Catholic Church by refusing to allow the ‘good works 
employers’ the same burden-free exercise of their religion” 
under the exemption.  (J.A. 118.)  The District Court 
questioned why religious employers who share the same 
religious tenets are not exempt, or why all religious 
employers do not fall within the accommodation, such that 
“even though [the appellees] here share identical, religious 
beliefs, and even though they share the same persons as the 
religious heads of their organizations, the heads of [the 
appellees’] service organizations may not fully exercise their 
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right to those specific beliefs, when acting as the heads of the 
charitable and educational arms of the Church.”  (J.A. 118, 
120.)  The District Court concluded that “the religious 
employer ‘exemption’ enables some religious employers to 
completely eliminate the provision of contraceptive products, 
services, and counseling through the Dioceses’ health plans 
and third parties,” whereas “the religious employer 
‘accommodation’ requires other religious employers (often 
times the same member with the same sincerely-held beliefs) 
to take affirmative actions to facilitate/initiate the provision of 
contraceptive products, services, and counseling – albeit from 
a third-party.”  (J.A. 120-21.) 
 
 The Zubik/Persico appellees argue that the District 
Court was correct in finding a substantial burden because (1) 
they interpret the accommodation to require them to authorize 
and designate a third party to add the objectionable coverage 
to their plans, in violation of their sincerely held religious 
beliefs that they cannot provide or facilitate that coverage; 
and (2) the different scope of the religious employer 
exemption and the accommodation impermissibly splits the 
Catholic Church.     
 
 The government, as appellant in both the 
Zubik/Persico and Geneva appeals, argues that the District 
Courts were incorrect and the appellees are not subject to a 
substantial burden, because the submission of the form is not 
in itself burdensome and does not give rise to the coverage.  
Rather, federal law requires third parties—insurance issuers 
and third-party administrators—to provide coverage after the 
appellees refuse to provide contraceptive coverage 
themselves.  By invoking the accommodation process, the 
appellees do not facilitate the provision of contraceptive 
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coverage by third parties.  Rather, the third parties providing 
coverage do so as a result of legal obligations imposed by the 
ACA.     
 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Standard of Review 
 We employ a tripartite standard of review for 
preliminary injunctions.  “We review the District Court’s 
findings of fact for clear error.  Legal conclusions are 
assessed de novo.  The ultimate decision to grant or deny the 
injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion.”  K.A. ex rel. 
Ayers v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., 710 F.3d 99, 105 (3d 
Cir. 2013) (quoting Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of 
Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 252 (3d Cir. 2002)).  The same 
framework applies to the review of a grant of a permanent 
injunction.  See United States v. Bell, 414 F.3d 474, 477-78 
(3d Cir. 2005).9  Because we conclude that the appellees have 
not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their 
                                              
9 “A party seeking a preliminary injunction must show:  (1) a 
likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that it will suffer 
irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that granting 
preliminary relief will not result in even greater harm to the 
nonmoving party; and (4) that the public interest favors such 
relief.”  Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 
(3d Cir. 2004).  It is the plaintiff’s burden to establish every 
element in its favor.  P.C. Yonkers, Inc. v. Celebrations the 
Party & Seasonal Superstore, LLC, 428 F.3d 504, 508 (3d 
Cir. 2005).  A permanent injunction requires actual success 
on the merits.  See Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 482 
(3d Cir. 2001). 
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RFRA claim, we need not reach the other prongs of the 
injunction analysis.  
 
B. Likelihood of Success as to Substantial Burden 
 
1. Trigger/Facilitation/Complicity 
Argument 
 We first must identify what conduct the appellees 
contend is burdensome to their religious exercise.  It is not the 
act of filling out or submitting EBSA Form 700 itself.  The 
appellees conceded at oral argument that the mere act of 
completing EBSA Form 700 does not impose a burden on 
their religious exercise. 
 
 The appellees’ essential challenge is that providing the 
self-certification form to the insurance issuer or third-party 
administrator “triggers” the provision of the contraceptive 
coverage to their employees and students.  The appellees 
reframed this proposition at oral argument, stating that the 
accommodation requires them to be “complicit” in sin.  
Appellees urge that there is a causal link between providing 
notification of their religious objection to providing 
contraceptive coverage and the offering of contraceptive 
coverage by a third party.  That link, they argue, makes them 
complicit in the provision of certain forms of contraception, 
which is prohibited by their religious beliefs.     
 
 Without testing the appellees’ religious beliefs, we 
must nonetheless objectively assess whether the appellees’ 
compliance with the self-certification procedure does, in fact, 
trigger, facilitate, or make them complicit in the provision of 
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contraceptive coverage.  Through RFRA’s adoption of the 
Supreme Court’s pre-Smith free exercise jurisprudence, 
Congress has required qualitative assessment of the merits of 
the appellees’ RFRA claims.  See Korte, 735 F.3d at 705 
(Rovner, J., dissenting).10  “It is virtually self-evident that the 
Free Exercise Clause does not require an exemption from a 
governmental program unless, at a minimum, inclusion in the 
program actually burdens the claimant’s freedom to exercise 
religious rights.”  Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of 
Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 303 (1985).  Furthermore, the Supreme 
Court has stated that “[a] governmental burden on religious 
liberty is not insulated from review simply because it is 
indirect; but the nature of the burden is relevant to the 
standard that the government must meet to justify the 
burden.”  Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 706-07 (1986) 
(citation omitted).  These principles were applied in Lyng, 
where the Supreme Court recognized that the Native 
American respondents’ beliefs were sincere, and that the 
government’s proposed actions would have severe adverse 
effects on their religious practice.  However, the Court 
disagreed that the burden on the respondents’ belief was 
“heavy enough to violate the Free Exercise Clause unless the 
                                              
10 We note that the Korte majority opinion may have been 
undermined by the later decision of the Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit in Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 743 
F.3d 547, 554 (7th Cir. 2014), petition for cert. filed, No. 14-
392 (Oct. 3, 2014).  The majority opinion in Notre Dame, 
decided after Korte but before Hobby Lobby, analyzes the 
mechanics of the accommodation and weakens the Korte 
majority’s urge for deference.  This type of analysis remains 
good law after Hobby Lobby.  See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d 
229, 247 (D.C. Cir. 2014).  
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Government can demonstrate a compelling need to complete 
the . . . road to engage in timber harvesting in the . . . 
[challenged] area.”  485 U.S. at 447 (emphasis added).   
 
 While the Supreme Court reinforced in Hobby Lobby 
that we should defer to the reasonableness of the appellees’ 
religious beliefs, this does not bar our objective evaluation of 
the nature of the claimed burden and the substantiality of that 
burden on the appellees’ religious exercise.  This involves an 
assessment of how the regulatory measure actually works.  
Indeed, how else are we to decide whether the appellees’ 
religious exercise is substantially burdened?  “[T]here is 
nothing about RFRA or First Amendment jurisprudence that 
requires the Court to accept [the appellees’] characterization 
of the regulatory scheme on its face.”  Mich. Catholic 
Conference & Catholic Family Servs., 755 F.3d 372, 385 (6th 
Cir. 2014) (quoting Roman Catholic Archbishop of Wash. v. 
Sebelius, 19 F. Supp. 3d 48, 71 (D.D.C. 2013)).  We may 
consider the nature of the action required of the appellees, the 
connection between that action and the appellees’ beliefs, and 
the extent to which that action interferes with or otherwise 
affects the appellees’ exercise of religion—all without 
delving into the appellees’ beliefs.  See, e.g., Korte, 735 F.3d 
at 710 (Rovner, J., dissenting).  For example, the court in 
Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 679 (D.C. Cir. 2008), 
“[a]ccept[ed] as true the factual allegations that 
Kaemmerling’s beliefs are sincere and of a religious nature—
but not the legal conclusion, cast as a factual allegations, that 
his religious exercise is substantially burdened.”  The court 
further explained:  “we conclude that Kaemmerling does not 
allege facts sufficient to state a substantial burden on his 
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religious exercise because he cannot identify any ‘exercise’ 
which is the subject of the burden to which he objects.”  Id.11   
 
 The Supreme Court in Hobby Lobby evaluated whether 
the requirement to provide contraceptive coverage absent the 
accommodation procedure substantially burdened the 
religious exercise of the owners of closely-held, for-profit 
corporations.  The issue of whether there is an actual burden 
was easily resolved in Hobby Lobby, since there was little 
doubt that the actual provision of services did render the 
plaintiffs “complicit.”  And in Hobby Lobby, the Court came 
to its conclusion that, without any accommodation, the 
contraceptive coverage requirement imposed a substantial 
burden on the religious exercise of the for-profit corporations, 
because those plaintiffs were required to either provide health 
insurance that included contraceptive coverage, in violation 
of their religious beliefs, or pay substantial fines.12  See 134 
                                              
11 The Zubik/Persico appellees argue that we should not 
independently analyze the burdens imposed on them, or the 
substantiality of that burden, because the government 
stipulated to facts contained in the appellees’ declarations—
particularly, that the appellees believe that participation in the 
accommodation, including signing the self-certification form, 
facilitates moral evil in violation of Catholic doctrine.  The 
appellees are mistaken, because the government’s factual 
stipulation does not preclude this Court from determining the 
contours of the asserted burden or whether the burden is 
substantial.   
12 Indeed, Justice Alito’s majority opinion in Hobby Lobby 
comments favorably on the accommodation procedure at 
issue here, which separates an eligible organization from the 
objected-to contraceptive services:   
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HHS itself has demonstrated that it has at its 
disposal an approach that is less restrictive than 
requiring employers to fund contraceptive 
methods that violate their religious beliefs.  As 
we explained above, HHS has already 
established an accommodation for nonprofit 
organizations with religious objections.  Under 
that accommodation, the organization can self-
certify that it opposes providing coverage for 
particular contraceptive services.  If the 
organization makes such a certification, the 
organization’s insurance issuer or third-party 
administrator must “[e]xpressly exclude 
contraceptive coverage from the group health 
insurance coverage provided in connection with 
the group health plan” and “[p]rovide separate 
payments for any contraceptive services 
required to be covered” without imposing “any 
cost-sharing requirements . . . on the eligible 
organization, the group health plan, or plan 
participants or beneficiaries.”  
 
 We do not decide today whether an 
approach of this type complies with RFRA for 
purposes of all religious claims.  At a minimum, 
however, it does not impinge on the plaintiffs’ 
religious belief that providing insurance 
coverage for the contraceptives at issue here 
violates their religion, and it serves HHS’s 
stated interests equally well. 
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S. Ct. at 2775-76; see also Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 245.  
Here, the appellees are not faced with a “provide” or “pay” 
dilemma because they have a third option—notification 
pursuant to the accommodation—to avoid both providing 
contraceptive coverage to their employees and facing 
penalties for noncompliance with the contraceptive coverage 
requirement.   
 
 The appellees urge that a burden exists here because 
the submission of the self-certification form triggers, 
facilitates, and makes them complicit in the provision of 
objected-to services.  But after testing that assertion, we 
cannot agree that the submission of the self-certification form 
has the effect the appellees claim.  First, the self-certification 
form does not trigger or facilitate the provision of 
contraceptive coverage because coverage is mandated to be 
otherwise provided by federal law.  Federal law, rather than 
any involvement by the appellees in filling out or submitting 
the self-certification form, creates the obligation of the 
insurance issuers and third-party administrators to provide 
coverage for contraceptive services.  As Judge Posner has 
explained, this is not a situation where the self-certification 
form enables the provision of the very contraceptive services 
that the appellees find sinful.  Rather, “[f]ederal law, not the 
religious organization’s signing and mailing the form, 
requires health-care insurers, along with third-party 
administrators of self-insured plans, to cover contraceptive 
services.”  Notre Dame, 743 F.3d at 554.  Thus, federal law, 
not the submission of the self-certification form, enables the 
provision of contraceptive coverage. 
                                                                                                     
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2782 (alterations in original) 
(footnotes omitted) (citations omitted). 
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 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit adopted 
Judge Posner’s logic that the obligation to cover 
contraception is not triggered by the act of self-certification.  
Rather, it is triggered by the force of law—the ACA and its 
implementing regulations.  See Mich. Catholic Conference, 
755 F.3d at 387 (“Submitting the self-certification form to the 
insurance issuer or third-party administrator does not ‘trigger’ 
contraceptive coverage; it is federal law that requires the 
insurance issuer or the third-party administrator to provide 
this coverage.”).  Most recently, and after the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Hobby Lobby, the Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit agreed with these courts’ explanations of the 
mechanics of the accommodation.  See Priests for Life, 772 
F.3d at 252 (“As the Sixth and Seventh Circuits have also 
concluded, the insurers’ or [the third-party administrators’] 
obligation to provide contraceptive coverage originates from 
the ACA and its attendant regulations, not from Plaintiffs’ 
self-certification or alternative notice.”).  Thus, submitting the 
self-certification form means only that the eligible 
organization is not providing contraceptive coverage and will 
not be subjected to penalties.  By participating in the 
accommodation, the eligible organization has no role 
whatsoever in the provision of the objected-to contraceptive 
services.13 
                                              
13 Geneva argues that there is no guarantee that its employees 
and students would obtain the objected-to contraceptive 
coverage if they were not enrolled in Geneva’s health plans.  
Therefore, Geneva asserts, the obligation to provide 
contraceptive coverage arises only because it sponsors an 
employee or student health plan.  Geneva cites the following 
passage from Notre Dame in support:  “By refusing to fill out 
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 Moreover, the regulations specific to the Zubik and 
Persico appellees’ self-insured plan are no different in this 
respect, and in no way cause the appellees to facilitate or 
trigger the provision of contraceptive coverage.  Those 
Department of Labor regulations state that EBSA Form 700 
“shall be treated as a designation of the third party 
administrator as the plan administrator under section 3(16) of 
ERISA for any contraceptive services required to be 
covered.”  29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-16(b).  The Zubik/Persico 
appellees argue that these regulations cause it to “facilitate” 
the provision of contraceptives because the signed self-
certification form authorizes the third-party administrator to 
serve as the plan administrator.  However, this purported 
                                                                                                     
the form Notre Dame would subject itself to penalties, but 
Aetna and Meritain would still be required by federal law to 
provide the services to the university’s students and 
employees unless and until their contractual relation with 
Notre Dame terminated.”  743 F.3d at 554 (emphasis added).  
However, Geneva’s argument is unavailing.  The provision of 
contraceptive coverage is not dependent upon Geneva’s 
contract with its insurance company.  “Once [the appellees] 
opt out of the contraceptive coverage requirement, . . . 
contraceptive services are not provided to women because of 
[the appellees’] contracts with insurance companies; they are 
provided because federal law requires insurers and TPAs to 
provide insurance beneficiaries with coverage for 
contraception.”  Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 253.  “RFRA 
does not entitle [the appellees] to control their employees’ 
relationships with other entities willing to provide health 
insurance coverage to which the employees are legally 
entitled.”  Id. at 256. 
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causal connection is nonexistent.  The eligible organization 
has no effect on the designation of the plan administrator; 
instead, it is the government that treats and designates the 
third-party administrator as the plan administrator under 
ERISA.  See Notre Dame, 743 F.3d at 555.  “[The appellees] 
submit forms to communicate their decisions to opt out, not to 
authorize [the third-party administrators] to do anything on 
their behalf.  The regulatory treatment of the form as 
sufficient under ERISA does not change the reality that the 
objected-to services are made available because of the 
regulations, not because [the appellees] complete a self-
certification.”  Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 254-55.  Indeed, 
this “opt-out” is just that—an indication that the eligible 
organization chooses not to provide coverage for the 
objected-to services. 
 
Moreover, the submission of the self-certification form 
does not make the appellees “complicit” in the provision of 
contraceptive coverage.  If anything, because the appellees 
specifically state on the self-certification form that they object 
on religious grounds to providing such coverage, it is a 
declaration that they will not be complicit in providing 
coverage.  Ultimately, the regulatory notice requirement does 
not necessitate any action that interferes with the appellees’ 
religious activities.  “The organization must send a single 
sheet of paper honestly communicating its eligibility and 
sincere religious objection in order to be excused from the 
contraceptive coverage requirement.”  Id. at 249.  The 
appellees “need only reaffirm [their] religiously based 
opposition to providing contraceptive coverage, at which 
point third parties will provide the coverage separate and 
apart from [the appellees’] plan of benefits.”  Priests for Life 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 7 F. Supp. 3d 88, 
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104 (D.D.C. 2013), aff’d, Priests for Life, 772 F.3d 229 (D.C. 
Cir. 2014).  The appellees’ real objection is to what happens 
after the form is provided—that is, to the actions of the 
insurance issuers and the third-party administrators, required 
by law, once the appellees give notice of their objection.  
“RFRA does not grant [the appellees] a religious veto against 
plan providers’ compliance with those regulations, nor the 
right to enlist the government to effectuate such a religious 
veto against legally required conduct of third parties.”  Priests 
for Life, 772 F.3d at 251.  “The fact that the regulations 
require the insurance issuers and third-party administrators to 
modify their behavior does not demonstrate a substantial 
burden on the [appellees].”  Mich. Catholic Conference, 755 
F.3d at 389.14 
                                              
14 A hypothetical example serves as a useful tool to 
demonstrate the fallacy in the appellees’ characterization of 
the accommodation:  Assume that a person, John Doe, has a 
job that requires twenty-four-hour coverage, such as an 
emergency room doctor or nurse.  John Doe is unable to work 
his shift on a certain Tuesday, as that day is a religious 
holiday that mandates a day of rest.  As a result, John Doe 
believes that it is inappropriate for anyone to work on that 
holiday.  John Doe can request time off by filling out a certain 
form, but he will be penalized if he fails to show up for work 
without appropriately requesting time off.  However, by 
filling out this form, he believes that he will facilitate or 
trigger or be complicit in someone else working in his place 
on the religious holiday.  John Doe sincerely believes that the 
simple filling out of the time-off request imposes a substantial 
burden on his religious beliefs.  In this example, John Doe, 
like the appellees, is able to express his religious objection to 
working on a religious holiday by declining to work that day.  
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Thus, we cannot agree with the appellees’ 
characterization of the effect of submitting the form as 
triggering, facilitating, or making them complicit in the 
provision of contraceptive coverage.  At oral argument, the 
appellees argued that it was not merely the filing of the form 
that imposed a burden, but, rather, what follows from it.  But 
free exercise jurisprudence instructs that we are to examine 
the act the appellees must perform—not the effect of that 
act—to see if it burdens substantially the appellees’ religious 
exercise.  The Supreme Court has consistently rejected the 
argument that an independent obligation on a third party can 
                                                                                                     
John Doe’s time-off request indicates that he will not be 
complicit in working on the religious holiday.  Furthermore, 
declining to work on that Tuesday does not serve as a trigger 
or facilitator because one of his other colleagues will be 
forced to work that day, regardless of whether John Doe 
works or not.  However, just because John Doe does not wish 
to be associated with or play any role in the result (working 
on a religious holiday), does not mean the conduct to which 
he objects (filling out the time-off request form) substantially 
burdens his free exercise of religion.  Just as we cannot 
conclude that John Doe’s religious exercise is being burdened 
by filling out the form, we cannot conclude that the appellees’ 
religious exercise is burdened by filling out the self-
certification form.  Furthermore, any “coercive” force 
attached to John Doe’s refusal to fill out the time-off request 
is similar to the fines that the appellees face if they refuse to 
either participate in the accommodation or provide 
contraceptive coverage.  In any event, such “coercive” force 
is relevant only if the conduct itself actually does substantially 
burden one’s religious exercise.  That is not the case in this 
analogy, and it is not the case for the appellees. 
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impose a substantial burden on the exercise of religion in 
violation of RFRA, as we discuss below.  Pre-Smith free 
exercise cases, which RFRA was crafted to resurrect, have 
distinguished between what a challenged law requires the 
objecting parties to do, and what it permits another party—
specifically, the government—to do.  
 
 In Bowen, the Supreme Court determined that the Free 
Exercise Clause did not require the government to 
accommodate a religiously based objection to the statutory 
requirement that a Social Security number be provided to 
applicants for certain welfare benefits.  Roy, a Native 
American, argued that the government’s use of his daughter’s 
Social Security number would “‘rob the spirit’ of his daughter 
and prevent her from attaining greater spiritual power.”  476 
U.S. at 696.  Roy’s claim was unsuccessful because “[t]he 
Federal Government’s use of a Social Security number 
for . . . [his daughter] d[id] not itself in any degree impair 
Roy’s ‘freedom to believe, express, and exercise’ his 
religion.”  Id. at 700.  Rather, Roy was attempting to use the 
Free Exercise Clause to dictate how the government should 
transact its business.   
 
Never to our knowledge has the Court 
interpreted the First Amendment to require the 
Government itself to behave in ways that the 
individual believes will further his or her 
spiritual development or that of his or her 
family.  The Free Exercise Clause simply 
cannot be understood to require the Government 
to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that 
comport with the religious beliefs of particular 
citizens.  Just as the Government may not insist 
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that appellees engage in any set form of 
religious observance, so appellees may not 
demand that the Government join in their 
chosen religious practices by refraining from 
using a number to identify their daughter.  
“[T]he Free Exercise Clause is written in terms 
of what the government cannot do to the 
individual, not in terms of what the individual 
can extract from the government.” . . . The Free 
Exercise Clause affords an individual protection 
from certain forms of governmental 
compulsion; it does not afford an individual a 
right to dictate the conduct of the Government’s 
internal procedures. 
 
Id. at 699-700 (quoting Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 412 (Douglas, 
J., concurring)). 
 
 And, echoing the principles of Bowen, in Lyng, 
members of Native American tribes claimed that the federal 
government violated their rights under the Free Exercise 
Clause by permitting timber harvesting and construction on 
land used for religious purposes.  485 U.S. at 441-42.  The 
Supreme Court concluded that the Free Exercise Clause “does 
not and cannot imply that incidental effects of government 
programs, which may make it more difficult to practice 
certain religions but which have no tendency to coerce 
individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs, 
require government to bring forward a compelling 
justification for its otherwise lawful actions.”  Id. at 450-51. 
 
 Building on this line of cases, the Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit concluded that a federal prisoner failed to 
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state a RFRA claim when he sought to enjoin application of 
the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act on the basis that 
DNA sampling, storage, and collection without limitations 
violated his religious beliefs about the proper use of the 
“building blocks of life.”  Kaemmerling, 553 F.3d at 674.  
Kaemmerling could not state a claim that his religious 
exercise was substantially burdened because he did not 
identify any religious exercise that was subjected to the 
burden to which he objected:   
 
The government’s extraction, analysis, and 
storage of Kaemmerling’s DNA information 
does not call for Kaemmerling to modify his 
religious behavior in any way—it involves no 
action or forbearance on his part, nor does it 
otherwise interfere with any religious act in 
which he engages.  Although the government’s 
activities with his fluid or tissue sample after 
the BOP takes it may offend Kaemmerling’s 
religious beliefs, they cannot be said to hamper 
his religious exercise because they do not 
“pressure [him] to modify his behavior and to 
violate his beliefs.” 
Id. at 679 (alteration in original) (quoting Thomas, 450 U.S. 
at 718).  “Like the parents in Bowen, Kaemmerling’s 
opposition to government collection and storage of his DNA 
profile does not contend that any act of the government 
pressures him to change his behavior and violate his religion, 
but only seeks to require the government itself to conduct its 
affairs in conformance with his religion.”  Id. at 680. 
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Thus, the case law clearly draws a distinction between 
what the law may impose on a person over religious 
objections, and what it permits or requires a third party to do.  
Although that person may have a religious objection to what 
the government, or another third party, does with something 
that the law requires to be provided (whether it be a Social 
Security number, DNA, or a form that states that the person 
religiously objects to providing contraceptive coverage), 
RFRA does not necessarily permit that person to impose a 
restraint on another’s action based on the claim that the action 
is religiously abhorrent.   
 
These cases confirm that we can, indeed should, 
examine the nature and degree of the asserted burden to 
decide whether it amounts to a substantial burden under 
RFRA.  Furthermore, we must assess how the objected-to 
action relates to the appellees’ religious exercise, and whether 
the appellees’ objections focus on the action itself or the 
result of the action, i.e., the obligations placed upon a third 
party. 
 
Far from “triggering” the provision of contraceptive 
coverage to the appellees’ employees and students, EBSA 
Form 700 totally removes the appellees from providing those 
services.  “[T]he regulations provide an opt-out mechanism 
that shifts to third parties the obligation to provide 
contraceptive coverage to which health insurance 
beneficiaries are entitled, and that fastidiously relieves [the 
appellees] of any obligation to contract, arrange, pay, or refer 
for access to contraception . . . .”  Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 
252.  The self-certification form requires the eligible 
organization or its plan to provide a copy to the 
organization’s insurance issuer or third-party administrator in 
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order for the plan to be administered in accordance with both 
the eligible organization’s religious objection and the 
contraceptive coverage requirement.  The ACA already takes 
into account beliefs like those of the appellees and 
accommodates them.  “The accommodation in this case 
consists in the organization’s . . . washing its hands of any 
involvement in contraceptive coverage, and the insurer and 
the third-party administrator taking up the slack under 
compulsion of federal law.”  Notre Dame, 743 F.3d at 557.  
The regulations accommodate the interests of religious 
institutions that provide health services, while not curtailing 
the public interest that motivates the federally mandated 
requirement that such services shall be provided to women 
free of charge.  Id. at 551. 
 
 Because we find that the self-certification procedure 
does not cause or trigger the provision of contraceptive 
coverage, appellees are unable to show that their religious 
exercise is burdened.  Even if we were to conclude that there 
is a burden imposed on the appellees’ religious exercise, we 
would be hard-pressed to find that it is substantial.  Whether a 
burden is “substantial” under RFRA is a question of law, not 
a question of fact.  See Mahoney v. Doe, 642 F.3d 1112, 1121 
(D.C. Cir. 2011).  RFRA’s reference to “substantial” burdens 
expressly calls for a qualitative assessment of the burden that 
the accommodation imposes on the appellees’ exercise of 
religion.  Korte, 735 F.3d at 705 (Rovner, J., dissenting).  
RFRA calls for a threshold inquiry into the nature of the 
burden placed on the appellees’ free exercise of religion:  
“substantial” is a term of degree that invites the courts to 
distinguish between different types of burdens.  Id. at 708.   
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 We have stated that a substantial burden exists where 
(1) “a follower is forced to choose between following the 
precepts of his religion and forfeiting benefits otherwise 
generally available to other [persons] versus abandoning one 
of the precepts of his religion in order to receive a benefit”; or 
(2) “the government puts substantial pressure on an adherent 
to substantially modify his behavior and to violate his 
beliefs.”  See Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 280 (3d Cir. 
2007) (interpreting a related statute, the Religious Land Use 
and Institutionalized Persons Act, which applies to prisoner 
and land use cases).  However, a government action does not 
constitute a substantial burden, even if the challenged action 
“would interfere significantly with private persons’ ability to 
pursue spiritual fulfillment according to their own religious 
beliefs,” if the government action does not coerce the 
individuals to violate their religious beliefs or deny them “the 
rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens.”  
Lyng, 485 U.S. at 449.  Under this definition, can the 
submission of the self-certification form, which relieves the 
appellees of any connection to the provision of the objected-
to contraceptive services, really impose a “substantial” 
burden on the appellees’ free exercise of religion?  We think 
not.  While Hobby Lobby rejected the argument that the 
burden was too attenuated because the actual use of the 
objected-to contraceptive methods was a matter of individual 
choice, here, where the actual provision of contraceptive 
coverage is by a third party, the burden is not merely 
attenuated at the outset but totally disconnected from the 
appellees.   
 
The reasoning of the District Courts was misguided in 
two ways.  First, the District Courts accepted the appellees’ 
characterization of the accommodation as causing them to 
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“facilitate,” act as the “central cog,” or serve as the 
“necessary stimulus” for the provision of the objected-to 
contraceptive services.  (J.A. 60-61.)  For the reasons we have 
detailed, we cannot accept that characterization as a matter of 
fact or law.  Second, the District Courts focused on the 
coercive effect, i.e., the fact that the appellees faced a choice:  
submit the self-certification form and “facilitate” the 
provision of contraceptive coverage, or pay fines for 
noncompliance.  However, now that we have dispelled the 
notion that the self-certification procedure is burdensome, we 
need not consider whether the burden is substantial, which 
involves consideration of the intensity of the coercion faced 
by the appellees.  We will accordingly reverse the challenged 
injunctions. 
 
2. Dividing the Catholic Church Argument 
in Zubik/Persico 
 The appellees in Zubik/Persico argue that a second 
substantial burden is imposed on their religious exercise in 
that the contraceptive coverage regulatory scheme improperly 
partitions the Catholic Church by making the Dioceses 
eligible for the exemption, while the Catholic nonprofits can 
only qualify for the accommodation, even though all the 
Catholic entities share the same religious beliefs.  The District 
Court agreed with the appellees and concluded that the 
contraceptive mandate “would cause a division between the 
Dioceses and their nonprofit, religious affiliated/related 
spiritual/charitable/educational organizations which fulfill 
portions of Dioceses’ mission.  Further, any nonprofit, 
religious affiliated/related organizations expelled from the 
Dioceses’ health insurance plans would require significant 
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restructuring of the plans which would adversely affect the 
benefits received from pooling resources.”  (J.A. 76 (citation 
omitted).)  We conclude that the inclusion of houses of 
worship in the exemption and religious nonprofits in the 
accommodation does not impose a substantial burden on the 
Zubik/Persico appellees.  
 
 The definition of a “religious employer” who receives 
an exemption from the contraceptive coverage requirement 
under the regulations is based on longstanding Internal 
Revenue Code provisions.  See 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a) (citing 
26 U.S.C. § 6033(a)(3)(A)(i), (iii)).  “[R]eligious employers, 
defined as in the cited regulation, have long enjoyed 
advantages (notably tax advantages) over other entities, 
without these advantages being thought to violate the 
establishment clause.”  Notre Dame, 743 F.3d at 560 (citation 
omitted) (citing Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 
666, 672-73 (1970)).  The Departments chose this definition 
from the Internal Revenue Code to categorize the entities 
subject to the exemption and the accommodation because that 
provision was a bright line that was already statutorily 
codified and frequently applied:  “The Departments believe 
that the simplified and clarified definition of religious 
employer continues to respect the religious interests of houses 
of worship and their integrated auxiliaries in a way that does 
not undermine the governmental interests furthered by the 
contraceptive coverage requirement.”  78 Fed. Reg. at 39,874; 
see also Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the 
Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 8456, 8461 (proposed Feb. 
6, 2013) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, and 
45 C.F.R. pts. 147, 148, & 156) (“[T]his definition was 
intended to focus the religious employer exemption on ‘the 
unique relationship between a house of worship and its 
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employees in ministerial positions.’” (quoting Group Health 
Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of 
Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 46,621, 46,623 (Aug. 3, 
2011) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; and 
45 C.F.R. pt. 147))). 
 
 Furthermore, we are not persuaded that the challenged 
accommodation poses any burden on the exempted appellees’ 
religious exercise, particularly a burden that would require the 
appellees to “expel” the religious nonprofit organizations 
from the Dioceses’ health insurance plans.  See, e.g., Roman 
Catholic Archdiocese of N.Y. v. Sebelius, 987 F. Supp. 2d 
232, 252 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“First, it is not at all clear why the 
Diocesan plaintiffs would have to ‘expel’ their non-exempt 
affiliates from their health plans. . . . Second, even if the law 
did pressure the Diocesan plaintiffs to ‘expel’ their affiliates, 
plaintiffs do not state that the Diocesan plaintiffs’ religious 
beliefs require them to have all their affiliate organizations on 
a single health plan, such that ‘expelling’ the non-exempt 
affiliates would be an act forbidden by their religion.”). 
 
 Thus, we cannot agree that the different treatment 
afforded to the Catholic Church as a house worship versus the 
Catholic nonprofit organizations imposes a substantial burden 
in violation of RFRA. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 We will reverse the District Courts’ orders granting the 
challenged injunctions.  Because we conclude that the 
appellees have not shown a likelihood of success on the 
merits of their RFRA claim, based on the determination that 
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the accommodation does not impose a substantial burden on 
their religious exercise, we need not reach the question of 
whether the accommodation is the least restrictive means of 
furthering a compelling governmental interest. 
